러시아, 세계 원전시장에 잠재적 공급물량 90기 확보 Nuclear Power in Russia

Nuclear Power in Russia

러시아, 세계 원전시장에 잠재적 공급물량 90기 확보

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    러시아의 국영 원전공급사인 Rosatom社는 전 세계에 걸쳐 건설을 위해 계약 하에 있는 잠재적인 원전 공급물량이 곧 90기 이상 될 수 있을 것이라고 한 임원이 2015년 9월 밝혔다. 

Rosatom社의 해외부문 자회사인 Rusatom Overseas社의 Olga Willis 사장 고문은 런던에서 2015년 9월 개최된 세계원자력협회(WNA, World Nuclear Association) 심포지엄에서 현재 자사는 국제적으로 29기의 VVER 원전 건설을 위한 공급물량을 확보하고 있으며, 31기에 대해서는 입찰이나 협상과정에 있으며 추가적인 36기에 대해서는 원전공급을 위한 초기 협의단계에 있다고 공개했다. 

Willis 고문이 밝힌 공급대기 물량에는 터키 4기, 인도 3기, 벨라루스, 중국, 헝가리 및 베트남에 공급할 원전 각각 2기씩 및 핀란드에 공급할 1기가 포함되어 있다. 자사는 70기의 VVER을 세계적으로 건설했으며 이중 56기가 운전 중이라고 밝혔는데 VVER 원전은 러시아가 기술을 보유한 가압경수로(PWR, Pressurized Water Reactor)이다. 

Willis 고문은 현재 러시아 내에서 9기의 신규 VVER이 건설되고 있으며 추가 12기가 계획 중이라고 밝혔다. 또한 자사는 수 기의 원전을 동시에 건설할 수 있는 능력을 갖추고 있으며 2030년까지 세계적으로 25기의 신규원전을 새롭게 가동할 계획이라고 공개했다. 

Willis 고문은 러시아는 사용후연료를 재처리해서 얻은 우라늄과 플루토늄을 연료로 사용할 수 있는 VVER 1000 개량형 원전 시범설비를 이 건설 중에 있으며 2020년까지 이를 완성할 것이라고 밝혔다. 혼합산화물연료(MOX, mixed oxide)는 고속증식로에 사용하고 재처리 회수 플루토늄과 우라늄에 저농축 우라늄을 섞어 ‘Remix’로 명명한 연료는 이 특수 VVER 1000에서 사용한다고 밝혔다. 

또한 사용후연료 저장이 전 세계적으로 현안이 되고 있다면서 VVER에서 나온 사용후연료가 세계적으로 현재 22,000톤 수준이며 2040년에는 44,227톤에 이를 것으로 평가하고 모든 노형에서 나온 것을 합치면 2040년에는 496,052톤에 이를 것으로 전망했다. 

Rosatom은 세계 핵연료시장의 17%를 공급하고 있는데 세부적으로는 15개국 76기의 원전에 공급하고 있다. 농축우라늄 부문에서는 전 세계 물량의 45%를 공급하고 있는 것으로 알려졌다. 또한 세계에서 2번째로 많은 천연우라늄 광상을 보유하고 있어 2013년의 경우 8,200톤의 U308을 생산한 바 있다. 

출처 KISTI 미리안 『글로벌동향브리핑』

(Updated 7 October 2015)

•Russia is moving steadily forward with plans for much expanded role of nuclear energy, including development of new reactor technology

•Efficiency of nuclear generation in Russia has increased dramatically since the mid-1990s. Over 20 nuclear power reactors are confirmed or planned for export construction.

•Exports of nuclear goods and services are a major Russian policy and economic objective.

•Russia is a world leader in fast neutron reactor technology.

Russia's first nuclear power plant, and the first in the world to produce electricity, was the 5 MWe Obninsk reactor, in 1954. Russia's first two commercial-scale nuclear power plants started up in 1963-64, then in 1971-73 the first of today's production models were commissioned. By the mid-1980s Russia had 25 power reactors in operation, but the nuclear industry was beset by problems. The Chernobyl accident led to a resolution of these, as outlined in the Appendix.

Rosenergoatom is the only Russian utility operating nuclear power plants. Its ten nuclear plants have the status of branches. It was established in 1992 and was reconstituted as a utility in 2001.

Between the 1986 Chernobyl accident and mid-1990s, only one nuclear power station was commissioned in Russia, the four-unit Balakovo, with unit 3 being added to Smolensk. Economic reforms following the collapse of the Soviet Union meant an acute shortage of funds for nuclear developments, and a number of projects were stalled. But by the late 1990s exports of reactors to Iran, China and India were negotiated and Russia's stalled domestic construction program was revived as far as funds allowed.

Around 2000 nuclear construction revived and Rostov 1 (also known as Volgodonsk 1), the first of the delayed units, started up in 2001, joining 21 GWe already on the grid. This greatly boosted morale in the Russian nuclear industry. It was followed by Kalinin 3 in 2004, Rostov 2 in 2010 and Kalinin 4 in 2011.

By 2006 the government's resolve to develop nuclear power had firmed and there were projections of adding 2-3 GWe per year to 2030 in Russia as well as exporting plants to meet world demand for some 300 GWe of new nuclear capacity in that time frame.

In February 2010 the government approved the federal target program designed to bring a new technology platform for the nuclear power industry based on fast reactors. Rosatom's long-term strategy up to 2050 involves moving to inherently safe nuclear plants using fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle. It envisages nuclear providing 45-50% of electricity at that time, with the share rising to 70-80% by the end of the century. In June 2010 the government approved plans for 173 GWe of new generating capacity by 2030, 43.4 GWe of this being nuclear.

Apart from adding capacity, utilisation of existing plants has improved markedly. In the 1990s capacity factors averaged around 60%, but they have steadily improved since and in 2010, 2011 and 2014 were above 81%. Balakovo was the best plant in 2011 with 92.5%, and again in 2014 with 85.1%.

Electricity supply in Russia

Russia's electricity supply, formerly centrally controlled by RAO Unified Energy System (UES)*, faces a number of acute constraints. First, demand is rising strongly after more than a decade of stagnation, secondly some 50 GWe of generating plant (more than a quarter of it) in the European part of Russia has come to the end of its design life, and thirdly Gazprom has cut back on the very high level of natural gas supplies for electricity generation because it can make about five times as much money by exporting the gas to the west (27% of EU gas comes from Russia). In 2012 Gazprom exports are expected to reach $84.5 billion, $61 billion of this to Europe for 150 billion m3.

UES' gas-fired plants burn about 60% of the gas marketed in Russia by Gazprom, and it is aimed to halve this by 2020. (Also, by 2020, the Western Siberian gas fields will be so depleted that they supply only a tenth of current Russian output, compared with nearly three quarters now.) Also there are major regional grid constraints so that a significant proportion of the capacity of some plants cannot be used. Some non-nuclear generators have been privatised, eg OGK-4 (E.ON Russia) is 76% owned by E.ON, and OGK-5 (Enel Russia) is 56% owned by Enel. Other OGKs are owned by Inter RAO or Gazprom. Some TGK companies (also supplying heat) are private, others such as TGK-3 or Mosenergo are owned by Gazprom.

* In Russia, "energy" mostly implies electricity.

Electricity production was 1071 TWh in 2012, with 178 TWh coming from nuclear power, 525 TWh from gas, 169 TWh from coal and 167 TWh from hydro. Net export was 16.4 TWh and final consumption was 742 TWh (after transmission losses of 107 TWh and own use/energy sector use of 204 TWh). In 2013 nuclear production was 162 TWh (17.5% of total) and in 2014 it rose to a record 180.5 TWh according to Rosenergoatom.

In November 2009, the government's Energy Strategy 2030 was published, projecting investments for the next two decades. It envisaged a possible doubling of generation capacity from 225 GWe in 2008 to 355-445 GWe in 2030. A revised scheme in mid 2010 projected 1288 billion kWh demand in 2020 and 1553 billion kWh in 2030, requiring 78 GWe of new plant by 2020 and total 178 GWe new build by 2030, including 43.4 GWe nuclear. The scheme envisaged decommissioning 67.7 GWe of capacity by 2030, including 16.5 GWe of nuclear plant (about 70% of present capacity). New investment by 2030 of RUR 9800 billion in power plants and RUR 10,200 billion in transmission would be required. In mid 2010 the projected annual electricity demand growth to 2020 was put at 2.2%. In mid 2013, UES projected 1.9%pa. Retail electricity prices are relatively low – for households in 2010, about 9c/kWh compared with EU median of 18.5 cents.

Rosenergoatom is the sole nuclear utility, following consolidation in 2001. In 2009 nuclear production was 163.3 billion kWh (83.7 TWh from VVER, 79.6 TWh from RBMK and other). Over 2010-12 it was 170-178 TWh, but dropped to 162 TWh in 2013. Before this, nuclear electricity output had risen strongly due simply to better performance of the nuclear plants, with capacity factors leaping from 56% to 76% 1998-2003 and then on to 80.2% in 2009. Rosenergoatom aims for 90% capacity factor by 2015. In 2006 Rosatom announced a target of nuclear providing 23% of electricity by 2020 and 25% by 2030, but 2007 and 2009 plans approved by the government scaled this back significantly. (see: Extending Nuclear Capacity below) In mid-2013 UES projected a decrease from 17.2% to 15.9% for nuclear output by 2020, with a substantial increase in fossil fuel power.

In July 2012 the Energy Ministry (Minenergo) published draft plans to commission 83 GWe of new capacity by 2020, including 10 GWe nuclear to total 30.5 GWe producing 238 TWh/yr. A year later Minenergo reduced the projection to 28.26 GWe in 2019. Total investment envisaged was RUR 8230 billion, including RUR 4950 billion on upgrading power plants, RUR 3280 billion on new grid capacity and RUR 1320 billion on nuclear. 

In May 2015 the Ministry of Economic Development announced a “very significant" delay in commissioning new nuclear power plants due to “a current energy surplus”. Commissioning of two new Leningrad units and two new Novovoronezh units was delayed by one year, and construction of Smolensk II was postponed for six years. In September 2015 Rosatom said it expected to commission 15 further reactors of 18.6 GWe by 2030, reaching 44 GWe then (so presumably no retirements).

In parallel with this Russia is greatly increasing its hydro-electric capacity, aiming to increase by 60% to 2020 and double it by 2030. Hydro OGK is planning to commission 5 GWe by 2011. The 3 GWe Boguchanskaya plant in Siberia is being developed in collaboration with Rusal, for aluminium smelting. The aim is to have almost half of Russia's electricity from nuclear and hydro by 2030.

UES wholesale electricity tariffs were planned to increase from (US$) 1.1 c/kWh in 2001 to 1.9 c/kWh in 2005 and 2.4 c/kWh in 2015. However, only much smaller increases have so far been approved by the government, and even these have attracted wide opposition. However, electricity supplied is now being fully paid for, in contrast to the situation in the mid 1990s.

In February 2007 RAO UES said that it was aiming to raise up to US$ 15 billion by selling shares in as many as 15 power generation companies, having increased its investment target by 2010 from $79 to $118 billion. Late in 2006 UES raised $459 million by selling 14.4% of one of its generators, OGK-5, and since then the UES sell-off continued with investors committing to continued expansion. In mid-2008 RAO UES was wound up, having sold off all its assets. Some of these were bought by EU utilities, for instance Finland's Fortum bought at auction 76.5% of the small utility TGC-10, which operates in well-developed industrial regions of the Urals and Western Siberia. From July 2008, 25% of all Russia's power is sold on the competitive market. The wholesale power market was to be fully liberalised by 2011.

InterRAO UES was initially a subsidiary of RAO UES, involved with international trade and investment in electricity, particularly with Finland, Belarus and Kazakhstan. It acquired some of RAO UES assets when that company was broken up in 2008 and it now controls about 18 GWe in Russia and Armenia. It was responsible for finding a foreign investor and structuring electricity marketing for the proposed Baltic nuclear power plant. It aims to increase its generation capacity to 30 GWe by 2015. In November 2008 Rosatom's share in InterRAO was increased to 57.28%.

The Federal Grid Company (RAO FGC) owns Russia's 118,000-km high-voltage transmission grid and plans to invest €12 billion ($14.5 billion) over 2010-13 to modernize it. It has signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Siemens to progress this, using the company's low-loss high-voltage DC transmission technology. The system operator is the Centralized Dispatching Administration (OAO SO-CDA).

 

[Full Article]

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/

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