중국 지방정부, 1540조 원 '이다이이루(一帶一路·육해상 실크로드 경제권)' 구축 돌입 Xi Jinping’s Reform Express Gathers Steam
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중국 각 지방정부가 최소 1540조 원이 투입될 것으로 예상되는 이다이이루(一帶一路·육해상 실크로드 경제권) 구축에 돌입했다. 시진핑(習近平·사진) 국가 주석이 주창한 이다이이루는 낙후된 중국 서부 개발에서 나아가 중국을 선진 사회로 도약시키겠다는 중국몽(中國夢) 실현의 핵심 과제로 부상하고 있다. 특히 한국과의 협력을 통해 이 경제권을 구축하겠다는 계획을 밝힌 지방 정부도 네 곳이나 된다. 향후 한국 기업의 중국 진출이나 교역에 이다이이루에 대한 국가차원의 전략이 시급하다는 얘기다. 중국 증권보는 지난달 중국국제금융유한공사(CICC) 분석을 근거로 정부가 향후 10년간 최소 8조8000억 위안(약 1540조원)을 투자하는 내용을 골자로 하는 이다이이루 구축 전략이 최종 조율 중이며 이를 곧 발표할 것이라고 보도했다. 투자 재원의 65%는 국가 외환보유고에서 충당하고 중국 수출입은행과 중국투자공사가 각각 15%, 국가개발은행이 5%를 맡는 내용이다. 투자는 주로 육·해상 실크로드 경제권 구축을 위한 교통과 공항·항만 등 인프라 시설에 집중될 전망이다. 각 지방정부 발표에 따르면 1월 말 현재 이다이이루 구축 계획을 세운 성과 직할시, 자치구는 모두 20곳. 홍콩과 마카오·대만을 제외한 중국 대륙 31개 성급 지방정부의 64%에 달한다. 산둥(山東)성 정부는 지난달 27일 성 인민대표대회(전인대·지방의회 격)를 열어 중·한 지방정부 합작과 동아시아 해양합작 심화 플랫폼 건설 등을 핵심으로 하는 이다이이루 구축 계획안을 발표했다. 한국 지방 정부와 협력을 강화해 기업을 유치해 해상 실크로드 경제권의 시발점을 산둥으로 하겠다는 전략이다. 이를 위해 칭다오(靑島) 자유무역구 설립을 추진하겠다는 계획도 내놨다. 또 성도인 지난(濟南)~칭다오를 잇는 고속철 등 8개 노선의 철도도 건설할 방침이다. 궈수칭(郭樹淸) 산둥성장은 이날 정부업무보고를 통해 “개혁개방 심화를 위해 이다이이루 전략을 잘 이해하고 중국이 한국·호주와 맺은 자유무역협정(FTA)를 잘 활용해야 한다”고 강조했다. 육상 실크로드의 일부인 칭하이(靑海)성은 지난해 12월 성도인 시닝(西寧)~인천과의 국제정기항공편 취항을 추진하겠다고 선언했다. 앞으로 한국 기업의 서부 지역 투자를 적극 유치해 육상 실크로드 핵심 경제권으로 부상하겠다는 전략이다. 시닝과 인천공항은 현재 전세기가 취항하고 있다. 헤이룽장(黑龍江)성은 시안(西安)에서 시작해 서쪽으로 향하는 육상 실크로드의 동쪽으로 연장을 추진하고 있다. 한국과 일본, 미주로 가는 물류의 중심 역할을 통해 성의 발전을 이루고 육상 실크로드의 동부 경제권의 중심 역할을 하겠다는 구상이다. 이 밖에도 후베이(湖北)성도 지난달 한국·일본과의 항공 운수망을 건설해 중원 투자유치를 하겠다고 선언했다. 이다이이루 구축을 계기로 중국 연안과 서부지역에 집중된 한국 기업투자를 중원으로 유도하기 위해 한국과 항공 노선부터 확보하기 위해서다. 산시(陝西)성 시안(西安)에서 시작된 육상 실크로드 황금 구간인 산시성·간쑤(甘肅)성·신장(新疆)·칭하이(靑海)성 등 지방 정부는 이미 지난해 관련 실크로드 경제권 구축 계획을 확정했다. 간쑤성의 경우 지난해 칭양(慶陽)~둔황(敦煌)을 잇는 1500여㎞ 문화구 개발 등 수백 개의 경제·문화 프로젝트를 마련해 실행 중이다. 신장 위구르자치구 정부는 지난달 20일 올 업무보고에서 올해 중 우루무치(烏魯木齊)에 아시아·유럽경제합작시범구 승인을 중앙정부에 요청할 방침이라고 밝혔다. 앞서 중국 정부는 신장 지역 투자 활성화를 위해 지난달 8일 카스(喀什) 종합보세구 가동을 최종 승인했다. 중앙일보 베이징=최형규 특파원 |
By: Arthur R. Kroeber After the enthusiasm which greeted the launch of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s landmark reform blueprint at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in November 2013, the mood among observers of China’s economy has gradually soured. A common view is that progress on economic reforms has been slow, bogged down not only by the opposition of vested interests but also by the government’s own distraction with its endless anti-corruption campaign, and by its anxiousness to support short-term growth through easy monetary policy. This popular take misses the mark in three respects. First, the top priority of Xi’s reform is not about economics; it is to remake China’s system of governance. Successful reform of government and administration, along with more specific market reforms, will, in turn, enable more sustainable economic growth. Second, China’s leaders clearly reject the view that to be serious about structural economic reform, they must accept a sharp cyclical slowdown. Instead, they believe that maintaining relatively rapid growth in the short term will give them more breathing room to push through their complex economic agenda. Finally, a tally of economic reform measures this year shows that progress has in fact been impressively brisk. Governance, Not Economics, Tops the Agenda Understanding the primacy of governance reform is essential to grasping the role of the anti-corruption campaign, which has resulted in the investigation or disciplining of over 70,000 officials at all levels of government in virtually every province, and has now spread to senior levels of the People’s Liberation Army. This campaign is often portrayed as a cynical effort by Xi Jinping to consolidate power, eliminate his enemies and curtail the influence of retired senior leaders, notably former Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. These motives no doubt play a large role, but the campaign is too far-reaching, and has gone on for too long, for them to be a full explanation. It is now apparent that the campaign’s central goal is to sharply reduce the system’s tolerance of corruption, which has been quite high since the beginning of economic reforms in the late 1970s. This, in turn, suggests a desire to renegotiate the basic bargain between the central and local governments that has held throughout the reform period. In essence, that bargain tasked local officials with maximizing economic growth, in exchange for which they were tacitly permitted to skim off part of the financial gains from that growth. Central authorities only cracked down when the graft reached grotesque proportions (as with smuggling scandals in Xiamen and other coastal cities in south China in the late 1990s), or when political and policy interests converged in an exemplary prosecution (as in the purge of Shanghai party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 2005, which both removed a Politburo rival to Hu Jintao and sent a message to cities to rein in property speculation). This bargain proved effective in stimulating sustained rapid growth while China was still a low-income country. But the nation’s economy has now matured and with a per capita national income of $6,560, China now qualifies as an upper-middle income country, by the World Bank’s definition. To sustain high growth at this income level, China needs better governance, a more reliable legal system and considerably less corruption. Thus, the anti-graft campaign is not incidental to or a distraction from the main reform agenda—it is an essential part of the foundation of a more successful economic and political system. Similarly, the legal system reform outlined at the Fourth Plenum in October, while disappointing many Western observers because it sanctified the Communist Party’s position above the laws that apply to everyone else, is in fact a significant step towards a more consistent, predictable, rules-based system. As Cheng Li has pointed out, the very act of devoting a Plenum to legal issues has made possible a discussion about how to create rule of law in China (see “Fourth Plenum Has Opened Discourse on Constitutionalism, Governance”). And the specific reforms that legal scholars believe are likely—creation of circuit courts to limit the influence of parochial interests, more consistent publication of court decisions, prohibition on Party interference in most cases and the creation of limited avenues for public-interest litigation against polluting industries—have the potential to make Chinese governance fairer, more transparent and more responsive to citizens' concerns. As with the anti-corruption drive, a key theme is to readjust the balance of power in favor of the central government at the expense of the localities. A final element in the governance reform agenda is the important but often-overlooked fiscal program adopted by the Politburo on June 30. By 2016, China will complete its first major overhaul of the nation’s taxation and government spending system in two decades. Key items include the elimination of land-based local government financing and its replacement by provincial bond issues; restructuring of taxes to reduce local governments’ revenue shortfalls and encourage them to promote consumer services, rather than heavy industry; and stronger resource and environmental taxes to arrest environmental degradation and promote more efficient energy use. Once more, much of the focus is on redefining the core role of local governments: their main mission will shift from promotion of economic growth to effective provision of public services. Cyclical Economic Management Supports the Reform Agenda Once we understand the primary role of governance, the sequencing of reform measures becomes more evident, and the relative tardiness of more narrowly economic reforms becomes more understandable. But skeptics have another concern: that the government is losing sight of its long-term structural reform goals in a desperate effort to keep short-term gross domestic product (GDP) growth above seven percent. The premise of this worry is that unless the authorities are willing squeeze out inefficiencies and curb the rapid rise in debt—measures which inevitably require a sharp slowdown in growth—then the structural reforms have little chance of success. In short, the economic model cannot change unless the old, bad habits are punished by clear failure. Two pieces of recent evidence support this view. First, early in 2014, Beijing relaxed monetary policy and started removing long-standing administrative restrictions on house purchases, in order to prop up a property market that seemed on the brink of collapse. These measures reversed the tight monetary policy of the second half of 2013, which succeeded in bringing credit growth down from 23 percent in April to around 16 percent by the end of the year. Second, the new, looser policy meant that the country’s aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio continued to rise in 2014. After rising from 145 percent of GDP in 2008 to 220 percent in 2013, this ratio continued to climb in 2014 and now exceeds 230 percent of GDP. In absolute terms, this figure is not alarming—most developed countries, including the United States, have significantly higher ratios. But the rapid increase in leverage in a short time is usually a harbinger of financial problems. It is a mistake, however, to assume that the continued increase in leverage shows that Beijing is incurably addicted to its old debt-fueled growth model, or that the authorities have decided to prioritize growth over reform. First of all, the credit stimulus used to support the property market this year was extremely modest: the year-on-year growth rate of credit ticked up only about one percentage point for a few months, and quickly dropped again once stimulus was withdrawn. The removal of administrative restrictions on house purchases arguably played a larger role in the property stabilization than did easy credit. More important, Beijing’s approach to deleveraging is a deliberate policy choice driven by the conviction that growth and reform are partners, rather than antagonists. A relevant comparison is the debate between U.S. and European policymakers after 2008 about the appropriate response to the global financial crisis, which left the rich economies stuck with low growth and big debts. Washington argued that policy must focus on sustaining growth (through ultra-easy monetary policy and large fiscal deficits), and that fiscal consolidation should take a back seat. European officials, especially in Germany, argued that fiscal consolidation and debt reduction had to be a top priority, even if it harmed growth. Beijing obviously favors an American-style approach to deleveraging and structural adjustment. Given the superior performance of the U.S. economy (relative to Europe) since the global crisis, this is a defensible choice. Economic Reforms are Proceeding Smartly The last point is that, in fact, China’s rollout of specific reform measures over the past year has been impressive. In addition to the fiscal reform package, whose significance has been severely underrated by the market-obsessed international financial media, achievements of 2014 include: • Abolition of registered capital requirements for new firms, which caused growth in new-company registrations to surge to over 20 percent, the highest rate in a decade. • Switching the resource tax on coal from a volume to a value basis, a long-delayed measure which should discourage excessive investment and promote energy efficiency. • Publication of a plan to deregulate all pharmaceutical prices beginning in 2015. • Publication by virtually all provinces of plans for “mixed-ownership” reform of state enterprises. • A significant opening of the capital account via the Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect program which permits investors in those two financial hubs to put money directly in each others’ stock markets. • The publication of draft rules on deposit insurance, paving the way for implementation next year, followed by full liberalization of deposit interest rates. Clearly these are just initial steps and much work needs to be done to broaden these reforms in ways that will have material impact on China’s $8 trillion economy. But it is hard to think of another major world leader whose government has accomplished so much in such a short period of time. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for instance, came to office two years ago promising “three arrows” of monetary easing, expansive fiscal policy and deep structural reform. So far he has delivered only one—monetary easing, which has driven the yen down and the stock market up—but structural reform is missing in action and fiscal policy was disastrously captured by Ministry of Finance hawks, whose consumption-tax increase drove the country into a needless recession. The U.S. government is gridlocked and is still fighting over a health care reform law passed five years ago. Six years after the global crisis, Italy has just begun to put in place long-overdue reforms to its labor market, and France, under its last two presidents, has done nothing at all to address its structural economic malaise. Xi Jinping can certainly be criticized on many issues, but failure to deliver on his reform agenda is not one of them. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/15-xi-jinpin-reform-kroeber |
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